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D&D Tire, Inc., v. Ouellette, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (Jul. 02, 2015)1 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: LIABILITY OF SUBCONTRACTORS AND INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS 
Summary 
 
The Court held that a subcontractor or independent contractor is not immune to liability 
for workplace injuries if the work being performed is a specialized repair. Ouellette was injured 
by an employee of Purcell while performing a task that would not be considered a specialized 
repair. The employee, however, was only present on the job site because of a specialized repair. 
The Court, however, held that the activity leading to the injury must be considered in context and 
the employee would not have been present but for the repair.   
 
Background 
 
Jack Ouellette was employed by Allied Nevada Gold Corporation to perform tire service 
work for mining equipment. He drove and operated a tire changing boom truck owned by Purcell 
Tire & Rubber Company2 and leased to Allied. Following a problem with the truck, Purcell 
contracted with an independent repair company, Dakota Diesel. Additionally, Purcell sent its 
own technician, Ryan Wintle, to assist with repairs. When the repairs were completed, Wintle 
planned to move the truck to another area for further testing. While backing up, the truck struck 
Ouellette and pinned him against a dumpster causing injury to his shoulder. 
At trial Purcell claimed that it was a statutory employee of Allied and was immune from 
liability under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). The district court denied Purcell’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and the jury returned a verdict for Ouellette. Purcell 
renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law and it moved for a new trial, claiming that 
the court’s refusal to give a mere happening jury instruction materially affected its substantial 
rights. The district court denied Purcell’s motion.     
  
Discussion 
  
Purcell argued that the district court erred in denying its motion because Purcell was a 
statutory employee and thus not liable for the injury under NIIA. Purcell also argued that the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to give a mere happening jury instruction. 
Ouellette argued that because Purcell was performing a specialized repair at the time of the 
injury, Purcell was not a statutory employee of Allied.  
 
The district court did not err by denying Purcell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law 
  
The Court discussed that a district court’s order granting or denying a motion for a 
judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. A district court may grant judgment as a matter 
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of law when “a claim or defense cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated.”3 A 
district court should deny such a motion if sufficient evidence exists that a jury could grant relief 
to the non-moving party.  
 
An independent contractor is not immune from liability when performing specialized 
repairs 
 
 The Court repeated its holding from previous decisions, which states that a subcontractor 
or independent contractor is not immune from liability under NIIA if it “is not in the same trade, 
business, profession or occupation as the employer of the injured worker.”4 Although the NIIA 
differs from industrial insurance acts of many states, in that it extends immunity to 
subcontractors and independent contractors, not all types of subcontractors and independent 
contractors are considered statutory employees. In order to determine whether the subcontractor 
or independent contractor is in the same trade as the injured employee, the Court considers the 
normal work test. 
 The Court articulated in Meers v. Haughton Elevator, the test is whether that 
indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather than 
independent contractors.5 The test does not consider whether the subcontractor or independent 
contractor’s activity is useful or necessary. The Court in Meers further clarified that the “rule is 
that major repairs, or specialized repairs of the sort, which the employer is not equipped to 
handle with his own force, are held to be outside his regular business.”6 
 
Purcell’s interpretation of the Meers normal work test is incorrect 
 
 The Court did not agree with Purcell’s argument that the focus of the normal work test is 
on the work being performed at the time the injury occurred. Although Purcell conceded that the 
repair would be a specialized repair under the Meers test, it argued that Dakota Diesel performed 
the service and that Wintle was merely supervising the process and not performing a specialized 
repair.  
 Because Ouellette was injured while Wintle was moving the truck, a job normally 
performed by Allied employees, Purcell argued that the work was not a specialized repair. The 
Court rejected this argument because the case law relied upon by Purcell was easily 
distinguishable7 and because such a narrow interpretation of the test could produce absurd 
results. If the exact moment of injury were to be the test, the status of a worker would change 
from moment to moment depending on the task being performed at that exact moment.  
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Wintle was performing a specialized repair at the time of Ouellette’s injury 
  
The Court held that, in order to determine whether a subcontractor or independent 
contractor was performing a specialized repair, a court must consider the subcontractor or 
independent contractor’s activity leading to the injury and not the injury in isolation.  
 In this case, Purcell sent Wintle to accompany the contractor who was hired to perform a 
specialized repair. Even if Wintle merely supervised the repair, he was only onsite due to the 
need of a specialized repair. Among other actions, Wintle’s moving of the truck to fill with oil, 
although a task usually performed by Allied employees, was performed in the furtherance of a 
specialized repair. Therefore Wintle was not a statutory employee of Allied and the district court 
did not err in denying Purcell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.  
The district court did not improperly reject Purcell’s jury instruction 
 A decision to admit or refuse jury instruction is reviewed as an abuse of discretion or 
judicial error. The Court reviews de novo whether the jury instruction accurately states Nevada 
law. A party is entitled to a jury instruction on every theory of its case, however the offering 
party must demonstrate that the instruction is warranted by state law.  
 In this case, Purcell requested an instruction that stated that the mere fact that there was 
an accident was not itself a sufficient basis for negligence. 
 
The omitted portions of Purcell’s jury instruction were adequately covered by other instructions 
  
The Court found that Purcell’s instruction inaccurately stated Nevada law by omitting the 
statement that negligence is never presumed but must be established by substantial evidence. If 
an instruction is not technically correct the context of all of the jury instructions should be 
considered.  
 In this case Purcell’s instruction was adequately covered by other instructions and taken 
as a whole the jury was sufficiently instructed.  
 
Purcell’s proposed jury instruction was adequately covered by other instructions  
 
 The number of instructions is within the district court’s discretion. Here the district 
court’s jury instructions covered the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and the need to find 
Purcell’s negligence.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The evidence was sufficient to suggest that Wintle was present for the furtherance of a 
specialized repair. Therefore he was not a statutory employee of Allied. The district court did not 
err in denying Purcell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law nor did the district court abuse its 
discretion in refusing to give Purcell’s mere happening jury instruction.  
 
